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REVITALIZING THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN FAMILY
LAW
Jane C. Murphy*
Mercy, detached from Justice, grows unmerciful.

-C.S. Lewisl
I. INTRODUCTION

The way families resolve disputes has dramatically changed over the
last decade. Scholars have focused on a number of substantive law
changes that have contributed to this transformation. These include the
changing definitions of marriage,2 parenthood,3 and families. 4 But less
attention has been paid to the enormous changes that have taken place in
the processes surrounding family dispute resolution. 5 These changes
• Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A. 1975, Boston College; J.D.
1978, New York University School of Law. I wish to thank Professors Theresa Glennon, Wallace
Mylniec, Bill Richman, Matthew Fraidin, and Leigh Goodmark for their comments on earlier drafts of
the Article. Many thanks to Jana Singer whose insights from our collaboration on an earlier work about
the issues addressed here are reflected throughout this Article. I also thank Megan Beechener and Sarah
Hale for their excellent research assistance and the University of Baltimore Educational Foundation for
its financial support. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the American Association of Law
Schools 2007 Annual Meeting and the 30th International Congress on Law and Mental Health
(University of Padua, June, 2007). Finally this Article is dedicated to the many judges, masters, and
lawyers who labor in the family courts.
1. C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment. in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 301,
308 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971).
2. See. e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Marriage & Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 421 (2008).
3. See. e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity,
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809 (2006); Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences of PostDissolution Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105 (2007); Sheelagh McGuinness & Amel Alghrani, Gender and
Parenthood: The Casefor Realignment. 16 MED. L. REv. 261 (2008).
4. Mellisa Holtzman, Definitions of the Family as Impetus for Legal Change in Custody
Decision Making: Suggestions from an Empirical Case Study, 31 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY I (2006)
(discussing the changing definition of family); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the
Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REv. 385 (2008) (analyzing the changing
composition families and the reliance on more than parents to care for children); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "It All Depends on What You Mean by Home": Toward a Communitarian Theory of the
"Nontraditional" Family, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 569 (1996) (discussing the changing patterns in marriage
and divorce and how these impact family structure).
5. But see AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 6-11 (2002) (embracing alternative dispute resolution as a tool for resolving
parental disputes after divorce); see also RECONCENING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN
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have been even more comprehensive and have "fundamentally altered
the way in which disputing families interact with the legal system.,,6
Both the methods and goals of legal intervention for families in conflict
have changed. The roles of judges and lawyers are fundamentally
different and less important in this new regime where dispute resolution
has largely moved out of the courtroom to "problem solving,,7 teams.
Taking a "holistic" approach,8 these interdisciplinary teams seek to
address both legal and nonlegal problems facing the families that come
to courts seeking legal remedies.
These developments have profound implications for the family justice
system. They also reflect a broader jurisprudential shift away from the
traditional values of the adversary system in both civil9 and criminal
justice. \0 In many ways, the debate about the relative virtues of the
structured procedures of the adversary system versus the informality and
flexibility of the new family courts reflects the same values clash in the
law versus equity debates of sixteenth-century England; many of the
same questions and tradeoffs are present. 11 Is the adversary system a
LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW AND FAMILY DISSOLUTION 409-24 (Robin Fretwell Wilson
ed., 2006).
6. RESOLVING FAMIL Y CONFLICTS xiii (Jana B. Singer & Jane C. Murphy eds., 2008).
7. Symposium, Problem Solving Courts: A Conversation with the Experts, U. MD. 1. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER, & CLASS (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Problem Solving Courts] (defining
problem solving courts as "an alternative court structure in which all participants work together to solve
the chronic behavioral issues often underlying the criminal or civil offense."); see also GREG BERMAN &
JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE (2005).
8. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law Jurisprudence:
Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. LJ. 775, 807 (1997).
9. See, e.g., DANA KRALSTEIN, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, A COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY
JUSTICE MODEL (2007), http://www .courtinnovation.org!_uploads/documentsfBaltimore_Eval.pdf (a
report documenting the efforts to create problem solving courts to address a range of civil matters).
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, THE NEW YORK STATE
ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: POLICIES, PARTICIPANTS AND IMPACTS (2003),
http://www .courtinnova tion .org!_up loadsldocumen tsldrulLcourt_eva\. pdf
(discussing
alternative
criminal courts for drug offenders). The shift in the criminal area also has its critics. See, e.g., Josh
Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REv. 783 (2008) (discussing the drug courts' failure
to rehabilitate the genuine addicts but only allow volitional users to game the system); Tamar M.
Meekins, "Specialized Justice ": The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New
Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1,26-27 (2006); Mae C. Quinn, Anna Moscowitz
Kross and the Home Term Part: A Second Look at the Nation's First Criminal Domestic Violence
Court, 41 AKRON L. REv. 733 (2008); Mae C. Quinn, Women as Perpetrators of Crime: Revisiting Anna
Moscowitz Kross's Critique of New York City's Women's Court: The Continued Problem of Solving the
"Problem" of Prostitution with Specialized Criminal Courts, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J 665 (2006)
(compares the early twentieth-century New York City Women's courts with today's Midtown Court find
both fail to address the problems of prostitution and may jeopardize the due process rights of
defendants. ).
II. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 18 (1969); I
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA § 29-31 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1877) (analyzing and explaining the British roots of
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source of rigidity or protection for family law litigants? Does the new
system permit the flexibility needed to tailor decisions to the needs of
vastly different families? Or does the new regime's broad discretion
jeopardize fundamental fairness with informal, inconsistent, and
unreviewable decisions?12
The proliferation of problem-solving courts around the country has
gained widespread media attention. \3 Policymakers have also offered
commentary on their efficacy in addressing a wider range of social ills. 14
But there has been little critical analysis of the broader question of
whether this profound shift in our justice system is sound. If, as many
concede, the adversary system fails families in variety of ways, do we
address its deficiencies or dramatically change its mission? In their zeal
to address the social problems that bring people to court, have the
reformers given appropriate weight to the values underlying the
traditional legal system? And have they adequately explored the risks of
the new paradigm, particularly on low-income litigants?
This Article addresses these questions and reframes the debate about
problem-solving courts by evaluating the relative benefits of the
therapeutic and adversarial approaches in resolving family conflicts.
the American courts of equity); see also Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth oj Discretionary Justice in
Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N. C. L. REV. 209 (1991).
12. See generally Problem Solving Courts, supra note 6. The debate about the constitutionality
of problem solving courts has just begun to reach the courts, primarily in the context of due process
challenges to drug courts hearing criminal cases. The cases decided thus far have just begun to explore
the issue. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 971 A.2d 932 (Md. 2009) (refusing to address the challenge that
Maryland's drug courts violate due process because issue not properly preserved); Evans v. State, 667
S.E.2d 183 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (holding state had a mtional basis for excluding defendant from drug
court); State v. Rogers, 170 P.3d 881 (Idaho 2007) (vacated lower court's ruling because defendant did
not receive his due process rights when terminated from the drug court program); State v. Filer, 771
So.2d 700 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (upheld a guilty plea induced on promise of entrance into a drug court
program but defendant was ineligible due to prior convictions); State v. Cassill-Skilton, 94 P.3d 407
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (vacated drug conviction because of lack of due process when defendant
tenninated drug court program). Constitutional challenges to the new regime have also been mised in
the context of mandatory mediation for certain family disputes. See e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public
Justice: Toward a State Action Theory ojAlternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 590 n.42
(1997).
13. See, e.g., Henri E. Cauvin, Public DeJender Calls Venues Unconstitutional, WASH. POST,
Apr.
3,
2009,
available
at,
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontentl
article/2009/04/02/AR2009040203732.html; Leslie Eaton & Leslie Kaufman, In Problem-Solving
Court,
Judges
Turn
Therapist,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
26,
2005,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.coml2005/04126/nyregionl26courts.html; Erik Eckholm, Courts Give Addicts a
Out,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
15,
2008,
available
at
Chance
to
Straighten
http://www.nytimes.coml2008/10/l5/us/15drugs.html?_r=I.
14. See, e.g., Douglas B. Marlowe et a!., A Sober Assessment oj Drug Courts, 16 FED.
SENTENCING REp. 153 (2003); c. WEST HUDDLESTON, III ET AL., NAT'L DRUG CT. iNST., PAINTING THE
CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURT
PROGRAMS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
(2008),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJN
pdfll2902_PCP_ful.pdf.
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Part One of this Article describes the changes that have contributed to
this paradigm shift in family law. Part Two explores the profound ways
the shift alters the traditional adversary system and the risks presented
by these shifts.
Finally, this Article concludes that before we
fundamentally alter the mission and structure of the justice system we
must address the deficiencies in the adversary system. It offers
proposals to strengthen the adversary system in family law while
incorporating selected elements of the problem-solving courts to design
a justice system that serves all families.
II. A PARADIGM SHIFT I5
An overarching theme of family law reform efforts is that the
adversary system is ill-suited to resolving disputes involving children.!6
The primary critique by reformers begins by noting that traditional child
access proceedings embody adversarial norms intended to minimize
direct communication between parties and maximize the courts' role in
decisionmaking. Divorce or custody actions are initiated by a lawsuit
naming a plaintiff and a defendant, and settlement negotiations are
conducted in the "shadow of the law."!7 Parties, if represented and
advised by lawyers, reach agreements by making difficult predictions
about who will "win" at trial. Under prevailing legal standards, the
party who prevails is the parent who most successfully depicts the other
parent as unfit, or who can most effectively assign blame for the parties
failed relationship.
Reformers accurately note that the acrimony
between parents engendered by this system harms children. Social
science research over the last two decades has made a strong case that
children's well-being following parental breakup depends upon their
parents' behavior during and after the separation process. 18 Much of the
research concludes that the higher the levels of parental conflict to
which children are exposed, the more negative the effects of family

15. Portions of this Part are based on the Introduction to RESOLVING FAMILY CONFLICTS, supra
note 6.

16. See Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best Interests of Children: A Proposal to
Transform the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 203(2004).
17. The phrase "bargaining in the shadow of the law" has become part of the language of
negotiation and dispute resolution and refers to the role the law might play in reminding parties of a
predicted court outcome and thus encouraging settlement. Similarly, where the law is indeterminate and
has no predictive value, the law does little to promote settlements. The term was first introduced in a
seminal article by Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979).

18. See ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD
CUSTODY, AND MEDIA nON 205 (1994).
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dissolution. 19
All of these circumstances have led to a call by reformers to abandon
the adversary paradigm, in favor of more informal approaches with the
goal of encouraging parents to develop positive post-divorce coparenting relationships. Nonadversary dispute resolution approaches
adopted in newly developed family courts range from relatively wellestablished court-connected mediation in divorce-related custody cases20
to family group conferencing and other problem-solving approaches in
child welfare proceedingsY Some lawyers have embraced the new
approaches through "collaborative lawyering" in which lawyers pledge
at the outset of their representation not to take a client's case to tria1. 22
As two leading reformers recently stated, "in the last quarter century, the
process of resolving legal family disputes has, both literally and
metaphorically, moved from confrontation toward collaboration and
from the courtroom to the conference room.,,23
Another element of the paradigm shift is the reconception of family
disputes from legal events to social and emotional events. 24 These
recharacterized family disputes, reform advocates argue, require
"collaborative," "holistic," and "interdisciplinary" interventions rather
than zealous advocacy.25 Lawyers have become less central in the new
19. Id.; Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-Solving Judges and
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and Unified Family Courts, 65 MD. L. REV. 82,
93-94 (2006); Vivienne Roseby, Uses of Psychological Testing in a Child·Focused Approach to Child
Custody Evaluations, 29 FAM. L. Q. 97,104 (1995): Andrew Cherlin, The Effect of Children on Marital
Dissolution, 14 DEMOGRAPHY 265 (1977).
20. See, e.g., ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY 57 (2004) (describing
the widespread use, structure, and function of mediation in child custody disputes).
21. See, e.g., Susan M. Chandler & Marilou Giovannuci, Family Group Conferences:
Transforming Traditional Child Welfare Policy and Practice, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 216 (2004); Clare
Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637 (2006).

22. Collaborative lawyering has been defined as having the unique element of a participation
agreement with clients which prohibits the lawyer from representing the client in court if an agreement
is not reached but promises vigorous legal assistance as part of a team negotiating an agreement.
Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.1. 317 (2004); William H.
Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
351 (2004); see also Barbara Glesner Fines, Ethical Issues in Collaborative Lawyering, 21 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL L. 141, 141-54 (2008) (arguing for greater ethical standards in collaborative lawyering
agreements); John Lande & Forrest S. Mosten, Collaborative Lawyers' Duties to Screen the

Appropriateness of Collaborative Law and Obtain Clients' Informed Consent to Use Collaborative Law,
25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 347 (2010) (an analysis of the risks of collaborative lawyering to divorcing
parties).

23. Andrew Schepard & Peter Salem, Foreword to the Special Issue on the Family Law
Education Reform Project, 44 FAM. CT. REv. 513, 516 (2006).
24. See, e.g., Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From
Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv.
395, 407 (2000).
25. See Andrew Schepard & James W. Bozzomo, Efficiency, Therapeutic Justice, Mediation,
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regime and the role of mental health professionals and nonprofessional
court staff has become more prominent. A related development is the
change in goals and ambitions for family court proceedings. The goal of
granting parties legal remedies such as custody, divorce, and financial
support has been supplanted by the goal of providing families before the
court a "holistic assessment of the family's legal and social needs ... to
devise more comprehensive legal remedies.,,26
Many of these developments may hold promise for families in
conflict who seek legal remedies to disputes. Using the legal system to
assign fault for divorce or to resolve child access disputes using
indeterminate standards like "best interests of the child" often results in
flawed decisions that take too much time and, if they can afford lawyers
and other litigation expenses, costs families too much money.27 And, as
I have argued elsewhere, the traditional adversary system will continue
to fail most parties as long as they are without lawyers or legal advice,
given family law's complex system of procedural rules and broad
discretionary standards. 28
The new paradigm offers an alternative to the flawed adversary
system for families who must resort to the court for legal remedies. But
important questions should be explored before we fully embrace the new
reforms. In a system where fully half of family law litigants are
unrepresented in court, have we .fully tested the effectiveness of the
adversary system to resolve family conflicts?29 What values embedded
in the adversary system must be maintained in any family justice system
to preserve the basic procedural and substantive fairness we require of
our legal system?30 And what impact would it have on low-income
families to embrace some or all of the elements of the "therapeutic
regime,,?31 Is there an alternative to the new family court's ambitious
and Evaluation: Reflections on a Survey of Unified Family Courts, 37 FAM. L. Q. 333, 347 (2003).
26. RESOLVING FAMILY CONFLICTS, supra note 6, at xv (quoting Babb, supra note 8, at 807).
27. See, e.g., Schepard & Bozzomo, supra note 25, at 341 (arguing that the risks of
"overreaching and incompetent judge[s]" in a unified family court "palen by comparison" to the "chaos
created for families" when family disputes are resolved in the traditional adversary system); Claudia
Wright, Representation of Children in a Unified Family Court System in Florida, U. FLA. 1.L. & PUB.
POL'y 179,180 (2003) (claiming that troubled "families may spin from courtroom to courtroom caught
in a process that depletes time, money, and energy, and yet never really addresses the core of the
problem."); SCHEPARD, supra note 20, at 4 (describing why the "underlying philosophical premises [of
the traditional adversary system] were incompatible with the needs of most children").
28. Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 123

(1993).
29.
30.

See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
For an in-depth discussion of the essential elements of a legal system in a democracy see
CHRISTOPHER 1. PETERS, A MATTER OF DISPUTE: AN ACCOUNT OF DEMOCRACY UNDER LAW
(forthcoming 2010).
31. See infra subpart 111.0.
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agenda that will improve the adversary system's ability to perform its
essential dispute resolution function? The remainder of this Article
addresses these questions.
III. THE CAUTIONARY TALE

Although the dramatic shifts in family dispute resolution have been
underway for over a decade, scholars and family policymakers have
engaged in little critical analysis of the risks and potential negative
consequences of such change. This subpart explores these concerns by
examining the limits of courts' institutional competence, the surrender of
fact-finding and decisionmaking to individuals without legal training,
and the disjunction between alternative dispute resolution and
established legal norms.
A. Do Family Courts Have the "Institutional Competence" to Achieve
the Goals of Reformers?

Institutions called "family courts" began appearing as early as the
1900s,32 and a Standard Family Court Act was circulating in the 1950s.33
But the new model of a unified family court with expanded services and
programs for both child welfare and divorce and child access cases did
not begin to be established around the country in significant numbers
until the 1990s. 34 As a result, there is limited empirical data, positive or
negative, of these courts' impact on the families they serve. But a few
observations about how these courts operate in both theory and practice,
how families experience these courts, and the impact of economics on
that experience are possible at this time.
32. Developments in the Law, Unified Family Courts and the Child Protection Dilemma, 116
HARV. L. REv. 2099, 2103 (Z003); Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The Potential of Model
Family Courts, 2002 WIS. L. REv 331, 334-40 (2002) (providing a brief history of the family court
movement); Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court. 46 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 261-62 (2008) (providing a
history of the family courts and the changes to the family courts during the twentieth century).
33. An Act to Establish a Family Court. Prescribing Its Jurisdiction. Powers. and Duties. and
Regulating Procedure Therein, 5 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N. J. 105 (\959).
34. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 3Z. INDIANA FAMILY CT. PROJECT, THE
FIRST FOUR YEARS 47-58 (Z004), http://www.ai.orgljudiciary/family-court/docs/2004-report/Z004report. pdf; Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Frameworkfor Court Reform in Family
Law: A Blueprint to Construct A Unified Family Court. 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 469,482-90 (\998); Unified
Family Site Update, UNIFIED FAM. CHRON., May 1997, at I; see also Patricia O. Barnes, It May Take A
Village . .. Or a Specialized Court to Address Family Problems, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 22. But see
Spinak, supra note 32, at 334, 364 (providing a brief history of the family court movement and noting
the cyclical nature of reform efforts); Boldt & Singer, supra note 19, at 91 (analyzing the new Unified
Family Court movement as an "outgrowth of the juvenile court movement of the early twentieth
century").
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Although families may benefit from the capacity-building and
problem-solving approaches embraced in the new paradigm, most courts
are not competent to provide these services. Court-based procedures
have historically been designed to determine facts and enforce norms.
The model family court movement has sought to expand this function
with a complex, ambitious agenda to address both the legal and nonlegal
problems of families who come before them seeking dispute resolution.
While the goals of the court system have expanded substantially, the
structural changes contemplated in even the ideal courts may not be
sufficient to meet the ambitious agenda and transform courts' traditional
functions. 35 Courts with their "limited remedial imaginations, may not
be the best institutional settings for resolving" the nonlegal issues
proponents wish to place within their authority.36 As a result, the
restructured family courts may be incapable of achieving the formidable
task of "provid[ing] coordinated holistic services ... to address the
physical and mental needs of the family.,,37
In addition to problems adjusting to the proposed change in goals and
function, state court dockets, particularly the family law docket,
continue to grow and resources continue to decline. 38 Recruiting,

35. The ideal unified family court has been defined as having the following components: (I)
comprehensive subject-matter jurisdiction over family-related legal matters; (2) a "one family, one
team" assignment system, designed to ensure that all matters affecting a family are handled by a single
judge or judicial team; (3) an emphasis on interdisciplinary training and collaboration; and (4) the
provision and coordination of a comprehensive range of court-connected family services. Catherine J.
Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a System of Unified Family Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q.
3, 15 (1998); see also PATRICIA A. GARCIA, A.B.A., UNIFIED FAMILY COURTS: JUSTICE DELIVERED
(2001) (summarizing the characteristics of unified family courts).
36. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5, 7 (1996) (arguing that the current adversary system is
inadequate for satisfying many important goals of a dispute resolution system) (internal quotations
omitted) (footnote omitted).
37. Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering Enthusiasm
With Caution, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 435, 437 (2002).
38. CT. STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2007: A NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
FROM
THE
COURT
STATISTIC
PROJECT
30-37
(2008)
http://www.ncsconline.orgID_Researchlcsp/2007_files/Examining%2OFinal%20-%202007%20%206%20-%20Domestic.pdf (finding a 5% increase in domestic relation case loads from 1997 to 2006
for the states represented with a general jurisdiction and 14% increase over the same time period for
state courts of limited jurisdiction); Connie Cass, Overflowing Dockets, Lack of Social Services
Frustrate Foster Care Judges, MIDWEST NEWS, July I, 2004, available at http://emagazine.adoption.com/issue/20Jul04.html (quoting family court judges saying that because of
overcrowded dockets "[y]ou wind up giving minutes to a case when you should give it several hours and
you just don't have the hours to give"); Wendell Large, The Cost of Justice, 21 ME. B. J. 119 (2006)
(discussing Maine's State Court's need for increased funding); Margery Gordon, Roadblocks to Reform,
MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., May 17, 2005, at I (referencing the Florida's Supreme Court warning that the
lack of funding for a UFC system may "imperil" the efforts to create such a system). Of course, the
economic crisis beginning in September 2009 has only increased the crisis in state court funding. See,
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training, and retaining appropriate judicial and nonjudicial staff for the
multiple functions contemplated or, in some cases, statutorily mandated
in these courts would challenge even a well-financed, broadly
committed effort. As one commentator has noted:
The Family Court model court movement is barely five years old, and
these courts are just beginning to realize the complexity of their
endeavor. Reading what the courts engaged in this experiment say about
themselves reveals a mixture of shock and optimism: shock at how hard
change is to accomplish, and optimism after seeing real differences in
outcomes for families and children. It is also apparent that some of their
earliest efforts were procedurally-oriented just to get them started.
Those steps have resulted in administrative restructuring and procedural
mechanisms for problem-solving that can now be applied to the
substantive mandates of the model court movement, an even harder task
to accomplish. 39
Asking a court system to take on these tasks may detract from its
fundamental role as a forum for fair and authoritative dispute
resolution. 4o Scarce resources would be spread even more thinly and
some courts may have difficulty meeting both basic conflict resolution
functions and the broader and more ambitious goals of the new family
courtS. 41 A recent study examining the impact of establishing family
divisions in one state demonstrates the difficulty in delivering the
promised services to more than a small percentage of litigants before the
court. 42 And, as more fully explained below, making good on the broad
promise of reform for even a handful of parties may come at a

e.g,

State Justice Institute, State Court Budget Shortfalls, http://www.sji.gov/articlestate_court_budget.php (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (reporting how state courts are suffering significant
budget losses due to the recent economic situation). ELIZABETH McNICHOL & NICHOLAS JOHNSON,
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'y PRIORITIES, RECESSION CONTINUES TO BATTER STATE BUDGETS; STATE
RESPONSES COULD SLOW RECOVERY I (2010), http://www.cbpp.orgifiJes/9-8-08sfp.pdf (reporting
forty-one states are experiencing budget shortfalls with severe fiscal problems likely to continue).
39. Spinak, supra note 32, at 374-75.
40. See Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 37, at 441.
41. Id.; John Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining the Courts' Roles and

Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials, Settlement Signals, and Other Elements Needed to
Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 213 (2006) (discussing the budgetary drawbacks of the
jUdiciary system); Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1521 (1993)
(arguing that certain judicial programs, such as ADR, which have not been shown to reduce costs,
should be cut due to budgetary restraints).
42. THE WOMEN'S LAW CTR. OF MD., INC., FAMILIES IN TRANSITION: A FOLLOW-UP STUDY
EXPLORING
FAMILY
LAW
ISSUES
IN
MARYLAND
49-50
(2006),
http://www.wlcmd.orglpdf/FamiliesinTransition.pdf (finding the Family Division did not provide
evaluative services in 75% of the cases involving child custody and that Maryland should develop and
implement a tracking system for services provided to family law litigants to ensure greater allocation of
services).
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substantial cost to long held values of due process, family privacy, and
autonomy.
B. The Surrender of Fact-Finding and Decisionmaking to Nonlawyers

The new paradigm for family law decisionmaking contemplates a
Some
substantial change in the roles of lawyers and judges.
commentators see a different, but expanded, role for these players in the
new system.43 But most commentary and much of the change already
implemented endorses the significantly expanded role of nonlegal staff
rather than lawyers in the new family court. Such staff "manage cases,"
provide court-connected services, and assist fact finders and
decisionmakers in reaching settlements or decisions. 44 One family court
proponent has described the need for an expanded role for these new
players in the system to provide:
[A] high level of administrative organization both to manage cases and to
coordinate services. The court management system, including nonjudicial
personnel, must aim to resolve disputes in a timely manner, to supply and
to coordinate efficiently the necessary resources or services, and to
network appropriately with other courts in the system to share
information about families that allows for consistent judicial
..
k'mg. 45
deClslOnma

Nonlegal and, in many instances, nonprofessional staff have always
exercised enormous influence on the outcome of child welfare
proceedings where the state has intervened after allegations of child
abuse or neglect. 46 But the role of such staff, particularly case managers
and mediators, has expanded in both child protection and divorce and

43. Andrew Schepard and Forest Mosten see an expanded role for lawyers under the new
paradigm. See SCHEPARD, supra note 20, at 125-37; Forrest S. Mosten, Emerging Roles of the Family
Lawyer: A Challenge for the Courts, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 213, 213-33 (1995). These
commentators include the following tasks for lawyers in an "enlightened" family justice system: "pro se
coach," dispute resolution manager", :consultant during mediation", and "preventative legal health care
provider." [d. Although there are efforts underway to improve legal education to prepare lawyers for
such roles, lawyers receive little training in tasks such as counseling those experiencing emotional
problems or acting as financial advisor. See, e.g., Jennifer Rosato, Reforming a Traditional Family Law
Professor,44 FAM. CT. REv. 590 (2006).
44. Babb, supra note 34, at 521.
45. [d.
46. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from
Welfare "Reform," Family and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 688, 707 (1998) (concluding that
child protective service workers who may have little or no experience or specialized education make
most of the decisions in this arena. "These workers make largely discretionary judgments about bad
mothering and their underlying assumptions are, for the most part, unexamined and unchallenged.
Conversations with workers reveal a deep bias about bad mothering based on race, class, and poverty.").
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child access proceedings in the new model courts. In tenns of child
protection cases, expanded use of nonlegal personnel can be attributed to
two trends prevalent in such courts. First, there has always been "a
subtle dynamic" that:
arises on a day-to-day level in these cases, due in part to the prevalence of
social work discourse and the tendency of the participants to view these
cases in therapeutic rather than legalistic terms. This dynamic implicitly
suppresses rights talk and discourages the participants from taking
advantage of those procedural protections that do exist. 47

Second, the family court movement has contributed to the expansion
of infonnal, nonadversarial alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in
child welfare cases. 48 As a result, social workers, child protection staff,
and other nonlegal actors playa central role in decisions about removal
and placement of children where abuse or neglect is alleged. As
discussed more fully in subpart III.D infra, the danger for families,
primarily poor, involved in these proceedings is that disregard for
statutory and constitutional nonns will result in extensive state
involvement in family life by nonjudicial personnel before any judicial
detennination of abuse or neglect justifying such involvement. And
decisions will be made in infonnal settings based on the evaluations,
however flawed, of staff with few standards guiding these decisions and
little or no opportunity for review.
The model family court has also expanded the role of nonlawyers in
private family disputes where the state is not a party, particularly those
involving divorce, child custody, and visitation. The nonlegal personnel
in these cases include expanded roles for professional staff drawn from
mental health and social work backgrounds with relatively established
roles such as mediators and custody evaluators. 49 They also include
staff with new titles and somewhat less established roles such as
"parenting coordinators,"So "early neutral evaluators,,,SI and "family law
47. Amy Sinden, "Why Won't Mom Cooperate? ": A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare
Proceedings, II YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 343-44 (1999).
48. Lisa Merkel-Holguin, Sharing Power with the People: Family Group Conferencing as a
Democratic Experiment, 31 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 155 (2004).
49. Mary Kay Kisthardt & Barbara Glesner Fines, Making a Place at the Table:
Reconceptualizing the Role of the Custody Evaluator in Child Custody Disputes 43 FAM. CT. REv. 229
(2005). For a discussion of the "elements" of custody evaluation in one jurisdiction, see Jeanne Allegra,

Elements of Custody, FAMILY L. NEW 12, 13 (February 2009) (describing her job as "making
recommendations about custody/visitation . . . when at least one litigant questions the other's
psychological stability and therefore, ability to be an effective parent.").
50. Christine A. Coates et aI., Parenting Coordination For High-Conflict Families, 42 FAM.CT.
REv. 246 (2004); Jacqueline W. Silbermann, Child Custody in Contested Matrimonials, 80 N.Y. ST.
B.J., Jan. 2008, at 16, 17.

51. See, e.g., Jordan Santeramo, Student Note, Early Neutral Evaluation in Divorce Cases, 42
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facilitators."s2 Finally, the new family court, at least as experienced in
some court systems, continues a pattern well entrenched in its
predecessor courts, of vesting enonnous power in nonprofessional staff
such as clerks, custody investigators, case managers, and, in many cases,
mediators. s3
As early as the late 1980s, a few commentators were beginning to
recognize the shift in both the rhetoric and decisionmaking in family
disputes, particularly in the child access area. Martha Fineman, in an
early and much cited article,s4 noted that the "professional language of
the social workers and mediators has progressed to become the public,
then the political, then the dominant rhetoric. It now defines the tenns
of contemporary discussions about custody and effectively excludes or
minimizes contrary ideologies and concepts."ss She attributed this shift,
in part, to the willingness of judges and lawyers to cede authority
because of their feelings of inadequacy to make judgments about the
best interests of children-the existing legal standard in child custody
decisions. 56
Recognizing the problems associated with leaving child access cases
to an adversarial system making decisions under a best interests
standard, Professor Fineman nonetheless cautioned against "turn[ing]
over the decisionmaking task to another professional groUp."S7 Though
these nonlegal professionals are considered neutral, in her view, they
have a bias in favor of joint custody, regardless of the case's
circumstances. 58 Judicial deference to agreements or recommendations
from these processes poses risks to primary parents and their children.
FAM. CT. REv. 321 (2004); Janet R. Johnston, Building Multidisciplinary Professional Partnerships with
the Court on Behalf of High-conflict Divorcing Families and their Children: Who Needs What Kind of
Help?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 453 (2000).
52. Deborah J. Chase, Pro Se Justice and Unified Family Courts, 37 FAM. L.Q. 403, 422 (2003).
53. Timothy Lohmar et aI., Student Projects a Survey of Domestic Mediator Qualifications and
Suggestions For a Uniform Paradigm, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 217, 218 (1998); Joan 8. Kelly & Janet R.
Johnston, Commentary on Tippins and Wittmann's "Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody
Recommendations: A Califor Clinical Humility and Judicial Vigilance",43 FAM. CT. REv. 233 (200S);
54. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727 (1988).
55. Id. at 730.
56. Id. at 740.
57. Id. at 729.
58. Id. at 730-31. (,,[Slocial workers and other members of the helping professions ... present
themselves as neutral, nonadversarial decisionrnakers in contrast to attorneys, whom they characterize as
both adversarial and combative. Yet social workers are not neutral; they have a professional bias in
favor of a specific substantive result. That result benefits their profession by creating the need for
mediation and counseling. It is this bias and self-interest that makes the process one for political
consideration. The bias inherent in mediation is different from, but no less suspect than, the bias that
can result from overt favoritism of one party over another.").
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Instead, she argued for a return to a legal model in custody cases that
protects and recognizes the role of the parent assuming care for the child
and proposed the "primary parent" rule to implement this goa1. 59
Other more recent critiques of growing reliance on nonlegal personnel
to make custody decisions raise concerns about the bases for such
"expert" opinions. Tippins and Whitman, a family law attorney and a
psychologist, argue that while forensic psychological assessments60 are
often "pivotal documents" that form the basis of judicial decisions on
child access, they fail to meet ethical and scientific standards of both
psychology and law:
Indeed, there is probably no forensic question on which overreaching by
mental health professionals has been so common and so egregious.
Besides lacking scientific validity, such opinions have often been based
on clinical data that are, on their face, irrelevant to the legal questions in
dispute. Indeed, whatever position one might take on the ultimate issue
rule with respect to other species of expert testimony, such opinions by
mental health witnesses on the ultimate question of a child's best interest
ought not to be allowed. . .. The best interests standard is a legal and
socio-moral construct, not a psychological construct. There is no
empirically supportable method or principle by which an evaluator can
come to a conclusion with respect to best interests entirely by resort to the
knowledge base of the mental health profession. 61

59. Id. at 770-74. For further discussion of this idea of a "primary caretaker standard," see infra
notes 152-53 and accompanying text. See also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Search for Guidance in
Determining the Best Interests of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint
Custody Preferences, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 1,37 (1985); Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent
Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3YALE L. & POL'y REv. 168, 180-82 (1984) (arguing
for a presumptive rule in favor of the primary caretaker); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d. 357, 363 (W.
Va. 1981). Garska has been modified by recent statutory changes in West Virginia that continue to
instruct judges to allocate custodial responsibility for children based upon past caretaking
responsibilities, but do not create a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker. See W. VA. CODE
§ 48-9-206 (2008) (directing the court to take into account the past caretaking responsibilities when
deciding custody sharing instead of solely on past responsibilities); John D. Athey, The Ramifications of
West Virginia's Codified Child Custody Law: A Departure from Garska v. McCoy, 106 W. VA. L. REv.
389 (2004). For a full discussion of the merits of the primary caretaker rule, see David L. Chambers,
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH L. REV. 477, 527-38 (1984)
(recommending a rule favoring the primary caretaker for children five and under). As discussed infra at
note 155, the ALI Principles have created some renewed interest in this approach to custody decision
making. No state expressly follows a primary caretaker presumption today. A number of states weigh
findings about who is the primary caretaker as a factor in child custody determinations. See, e.g.,
Michigan Child Custody Act of 1970, MICH. COMPo LAWS § 722.23 (2009). In other states, the primary
caretaker inquiry is a creature of common law. Kjelland v. Kjelland, 609 N.W.2d 100 (N.D. 2000).
60. Matthew T. Huss, What is Forensic Psychology? It's Not Silence of the Lambs!, EYE ON PSI
CHI, Spring 2001, http://www.psichi.orglpubs/articles/article_58.asp (defining forensic psychology as
the intersection of mental health and the law through the practice of clinical psychology).
61. Timothy M. Tippins & Jeffrey P. Wittmann, Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody
Recommendations: A Callfor Clinical Humility and Judicial Vigilance, 43 FAM. Cr. REv. 193,214-15
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Others have noted that this critique can also be applied, perhaps more
forcefully, to the range of nonlegal and nonprofessional staff who often
conduct custody investigations and assist courts in reaching custody
decisions:
[C]ustody evaluators are more likely to make inferences and
recommendations from unsubstantiated theory, personal values and
experiences, and cultural and personal biases. Our own observations and
reviews of evaluations over several decades lead us to the same
conclusion. Common examples include unexamined strong beliefs in the
primacy of mothers (or essentiality of fathers) regardless of the
circumstances, biased perception of their clients derived from their own
negative marital and divorce experiences, or a conviction that joint
physical custody benefits (or harms) all children. 62

Criticism of increased reliance on nonjudicial personnel also stems
from the often unclear ethical standards that govern such personnel's
behavior. While nonlawyer mediators may be bound by court rules or
statutes requiring mediator confidentiality, prohibiting testimony in
court, or ex parte contacts with judges about mediation sessions,63 not all
states have such rules. Indeed, some state statutes authorize mediators
to make recommendations to the court if mediation fails. 64 The ethical
obligations of staff with roles such as "custody evaluators" or "parenting
coordinators" are even less clear. Commentators have raised concerns
about the practices of such staff in both obtaining information about
parties and sharing such information with judges and others. 65 These
concerns exist when parties are represented by counsel and court
personnel do not appropriately consult with counsel before giving
"advice" to parties or seeking information from them66 These concerns
are even greater when parties are unrepresented and have little
understanding of the relative authority of various players in the family
court system. 67

(2005) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
62. Kelly & Johnston, supra note 53, at 233; see also Kisthardt & Fines, supra note 49, at 22932; Nancy Ver Steegh & Clare Dalton, Report from the Wingspread Conference of Domestic Violence
and Family Courts, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 454, 461 (2008) (noting the wide range of education and training
among court personnel screening family cases for mediation and other services).
63. See. e.g., MD. R. PROC. § 17-109; GA. SUP. CT. MEDIATION R. 7(a}-{b); PA. R. CIV. PRO.
1940.2; U.S. DIST. CT. R. W.O. VA. 83.
64. See, e.g., CAL. ALAMEDA CTY. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 10.1.11; Caroline Harris Crowne, The
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998: Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1768,1803 (2001).
65. See Merkel-Holguin, supra note 48, at 161.
66. Chase, supra note 52, at 423.
67. Id.
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C. The Disjunction Between Alternative Dispute Resolution and Legal

Norms
A centerpiece of the new paradigm in family decisionmaking is the
expanded use of alternative dispute resolution and, in particular,
mediation. The use of mediation in divorce and related child access
disputes is relatively established but has grown exponentially as courtmandated family mediation has spread in the new family courtS. 68 Most
recently, use of mediation or "family conferencing" has spread into child
welfare cases. 69 Encouraged by judges and court administrators who
welcome both the reduction of cases on their dockets and relief from
making difficult child placement decisions, mediation continues to grow
throughout the family court system.
It is difficult to underestimate the sea change in family dispute
resolution when moving from the courtroom to the mediation room.
Like many of the reforms, mediation presents both possibilities and risks
as an alternative to a legal system suffused with the norms of traditional
advocacy. There is no fact finder or decision maker apart from the
parties in mediation. Rather, a mediator "facilitates" the parties in
resolving their own disputes.?O Mediating parties "may address any
issue they wish, not limited to legal causes of action; they may bring in
any information they wish, not limited by rules of evidence and
procedure to probative evidence, relevant to legal causes of action and
meeting evidentiary requirements for authenticity and accuracy."? 1
Even in court-based programs, the sessions are private and informal with
few rules governing the scope of discussions or exchange of
information, other than mediator-developed rules of courtesy. Legal
norms play a very limited role. While laws regarding child support
formula may be mentioned, in mediation of child access issues, and to
some extent, marital property and alimony, parties are encouraged to
generate their own norms that guide the resolution to their dispute.72
In appropriate cases, mediation can empower parties, enhance their
ability to work together in the future, and promote flexible and creative

68. DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 3-22 (Jay
Folberg et al. eds., 2004); see also JANE C. MURPHY & ROBERT RUBINSON, FAMILY MEDIATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 10-12 (2009).

69. See Merkel-Holguin, supra note 48.
70. See. e.g.. MURPHY & RUBINSON, supra note 68, at 12.
71. Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were A Mediator: An Inquiry Into Justice in
Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 157, 161 (2002).
72. Ellen A. Waldman, IdentifYing the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model
Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 708 (1997); Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party EmpowermentAnd of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 50 I, 534 (1997).
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problem-solving. It has particular value in family disputes where
strengthening, rather than harming relationships in the dispute resolution
process is important because of the need for ongoing relationships to coparent children after family breakup.73 But participation in mediation
also poses a serious risk that parties may waive important legal rights or
enter agreements that exacerbate conflict. This is particularly true when
mediators are ill-equipped or poorly trained. 74 Bad mediators can do
great harm--especially to vulnerable parties-when the "empowering"
promise of mediation can instead become an exercise in coercion and
arm-twisting. 75 This risk is particularly acute without appellate review,
a public record, or established grievance procedures that, at least in
theory, provide a check on the risk of "bad" judging.
The risks of mediation increase when parties are encouraged or
ordered to participate in mediation and lack information about legal
norms. Attorneys have not traditionally played a central role in
mediation. Unless confronted with a court order for mediation,
attorneys rarely mention mediation as an option for clients facing family
breakup, either through divorce or child welfare proceedings. 76
Although some quickly recognized the important role attorneys can play
in both preparing clients for mediation, and in the mediation sessions
themselves,77 the prevailing view is that attorneys have little or no role
to play in mediation. 78 Some proponents of mediation not only see
73. Ann Milne, Mediation-A Promising Alternativefor Family Courts, 42 Juv. & FAM. CT. J.
61 (\991) (arguing that mediation is particularly well-suited to resolving disputes among family
members because agreements, rather than a public adversarial proceeding, are less destructive to family
relationships, particularly parent-child ties).
74. KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 429-78 (1994).
75. For a discussion of the damage that poor mediators can wreak in family law mediation, see,
for example, Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, I 00 YALE L. J.
1545, 1603 (\ 991); Penelope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: the Lawyer's Role in Divorce
Mediation, 28 FAM. L. Q. 177 (1994). For a rare instance where an alleged bad mediator was subjected
to judicial scrutiny, albeit unsuccessfully, see Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
(plaintiffs alleged that mediator coerced settlement).
76. In response to this concern, the American Bar Association added language to its Comments
to Model Rule 2.1 Scope of Advice suggesting that lawyers may be obligated to advise clients about the
availability of alternative dispute resolution. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 5
(2002) (noting that "when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary ... to inform the
client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation.").
77. Craig A. McEwen et aI., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to
Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1317 (1995) (analyzing a study oflawyer
participation in divorce mediation in Maine and concluding that such participation protects clients and
otherwise improves the quality of the mediation process).
78. Mark C. Rutherford, Lawyers and Divorce Mediation: Designing The Role of "Outside
Counsel", 12 MEDIATION Q., June 1986, at 17,27 ("For mediation to succeed as a profession and to
reach its highest objectives, advocacy has no place in any part of the process. For outside counsel to
advocate a client's interests contradicts the very essence of mediation and can produce inequitable
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attorneys as having a limited role, but actively discourage their
participation. Without rules of procedure and evidence or governing
substantive law they argue, parties can navigate the process of mediation
themselves. Attorneys have little or no role under this conception of
family mediation.
But the risk of loss of rights in the mediation process is significantly
greater for unrepresented parties. 79 Even if the attorney does not attend
the mediation, the represented party has far greater access to an expert
source of information about judicial proceedings, each party's legal
rights and remedies, and the parties' chances of success in court. The
unrepresented party has no comparable source of information when a
"neutral" mediator facilitates an agreement. One scholar described his
view of the potential harm for unrepresented litigants in court-sponsored
mediation programs:
From a mediator's point of view, the [neutral role of mediator] flows
naturally from the concept of mediation, a process voluntarily selected
by the parties as a means of dispute resolution different from an
adversarial trial. From an unrepresented litigant's point of view,
however, the effect of the rules can be devastating. The pressure exerted
by courts to send cases to mediation and the lack of explanation of the
mediation process raise serious questions about the "voluntary" nature
of the decision to mediate. Once in mediation, the pressures on
mediators to obtain settlements are immense. With a large number of
unrepresented litigants, this pressure guarantees that mediators will
rarely, if ever, exercise the option to terminate the mediation due to the
incapacity of an unrepresented litigant to participate. . .. In mediated
settlements, the routine waiver of rights by unrepresented litigants flows
from presumptions that the choice to mediate is voluntary and informed;
that the litigant has a realistic opportunity to obtain counsel and chooses
to forego counsel; that the litigant has access to independent advice; and
that the litigant appears in mediation aware of her legal rights and
capable of participating in mediation.... In theory, judges could
provide a check on the dangers identified above in mediation, because
mediated agreements are usually sent to them for approval. In reality,
judges typically rubber-stamp agreements reached in mediation. 8o
results."); see UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 10 (2001); see also MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR
AND DIVORCE MEDIATION 3 (2000), available at http://www.afccnet.orglpdfs/
modelstandards.pdf.
79. For a discussion of the substantial numbers of unrepresented parties in family court cases, see
infra notes 96, 123, and 126.
80. Russell Engler, And Justice For All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: ReviSiting the Roles
a/the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987,2010-11 (1999) (footnotes omitted)
(arguing for changing the role of mediator when one or both parties are unrepresented to include
FAMILY
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The risks of mediation are also heightened when one party is less
powerful than the other. 81 Lack of formal procedures; confidential,
private setting; focus on the parties' "needs" rather than "rights" under
substantive family law; and virtual lack of review of both the process
and outcome of mediation create a setting where the more powerful may
dominate, and bias and prejudice are unchecked. 82 Power imbalances
may exist where only one party is represented by an attorney or may
result from race, gender, class, sexual orientation, and cultural
differences in mediation. 83
The most disabling power imbalance in mediation may be where
domestic violence has taken place. In these cases, there has already
been a severe abuse of power and the consequent power imbalance can
make mediation impossible. A consensus has emerged that cases
involving family violence need special treatment in mediation, reflected
in both standards for mediators 84 and mediation statutes and rules. 85
providing legal information); see also Waldman, supra note 72 (proposing a "norm educating" or even
"norm advocating" role for mediators in some situations, including certain types of family mediation).
But the vast majority of mediators reject such a role. See e.g., Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why
Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1997).
81. One of the earliest articulations of this position is the often-cited article by Trina Grillo,
supra note 75. Of course, some mediators argue that just opposite is true: mediation is particularly
appropriate for relationships marked by power imbalances, particularly gender. They argue that
the hierarchical, "winner takes all" approach of a still white, male dominated adversary system further
disempowers and silences the less powerful. The delays, expense, complexity, and inflexibility of
litigation make it particularly well-suited to resolving family law disputes. Mediation, on the other
hand, with its emphasis on listening, relationships, and problem-solving has greater potential to "heal"
and "hear" all voices. Further, mediation's focus on permitting participants to express emotions and
articulate needs may be better suited to women than men. Its procedural informality, lack of reliance on
substantive rules of law, and lower cost might make it more accessible to those who cannot afford
lawyers and are not well versed in the American justice system. See, e.g., Jonathan Lippman, Achieving
Better Outcomes for Litigants in the New York State Courts, 34 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 813,815 (2007);
Anne K. Suboume, Motivations for Mediation: An Examination of the Philosophies Governing Divorce
Mediation in the International Context, 38 TEX.INT'L L.J. 381, 382-83 (2002); James R. Holbrook, The
Effects of Alternative Dispute Resolution On Access to Justice in Utah, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 1017, 102125 (2006); Robert E. Emery et aI., Divorce Mediation: Research and Reflections, 43 FAM. CT. REv. 22,
22-37 (2005). Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, What Role Does Gender Play in Mediation of Domestic
Relations Cases?, 86 JUDICATURE 134 (2002).
82. Michael Lang, Understanding and Responding to Power in Mediation, in DIVORCE AND
FAMIL Y MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND ApPLICATIONS supra note 68, at 209, 213-15.
83. Richard Delgado et aI., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985).
84. The Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, endorsed by among
others, the American Bar Association and the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, include
provisions defining domestic violence, requiring domestic violence training for mediators, screening,
and setting forth steps to ensure safety during mediation. Model Standards of Practice for Family and
Divorce Mediation, 39 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 121, 127 (2001). The Model Standards also
recognize that some cases should not be mediated "because of safety, control, or intimidation issues."
Id. at 132. "A mediator should make a reasonable effort to screen for the existence of domestic abuse
prior to entering into an agreement to mediate. The mediator should continue to assess for domestic
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Despite this consensus, there is evidence that the new family courts, in
which mediation plays such a central role, still order couples who have
experienced domestic violence to mediate family law disputes with little
86

or no particularized examination of the couples' circumstances.

Perhaps an even more troubling example of risks posed by mediation
in the face of a disabling power imbalance is family conferencing in
child welfare cases. While these cases may involve more attorneys than
private family disputes,87 the attorneys' role in family conferencing is as
88
ill-defined and limited as in divorce and custody mediations.
And
89
these cases are often marked by intimate partner violence and parties
90
with limited education and resources.
All these circumstances create
risks that a parent, most often the mother, will "suppress[] her point of
view in order to achieve agreement," and not benefit from available
91
statutory or constitutional protections.
As Amy Sinden has described:

[I]nformal procedures are unlikely overall to be as successful as formal
ones in meeting the outcome and process goals of due process. The
substantial power disparity between the parties, the emotionally charged
nature of the subject matter, and the lack of a shared set of interests and
values between the parties all tend to distort the decision making process.
Traditional formal adversarial processes have mechanisms that, while far
from perfect, are designed to combat the distortion caused by such

abuse throughout the mediation process." Id. Another group of distinguished academics, judges and
practicing lawyers, the American Law Institute (ALI), has also addressed mediating family disputes
where domestic violence is present. In its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, the ALI takes
the position that the risks of coercion and intimidation in mediation for victims of domestic violence
require that all mediation programs be voluntary. AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, § 2.07(2).
85. Courts and legislatures have responded to the consensus that domestic violence cases should
be given special treatment in mediation by enacting a variety of rules and statutes to achieve that goal.
As of 2004, forty two states had enacted statewide statutes or court rules authorizing mandatory,
discretionary, or voluntary court-sponsored mediation programs of selected family law disputes. Of the
forty-two statutes or rules, twenty-nine create some kind of exception to the court's authority. Jane C.
Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and Mediation: Responding to the Challenges 0/
Creating Effective Screens, 39 FAM. L.Q. 53 (2005).
86. Id. (citing studies in California and Maryland's Family Courts in which large numbers of
cases involving family violence go to family mediation without being identified and properly screened).
But see id. at 62-63 (report identifying new procedures for court screening of domestic violence cases
prior to referral for court-sponsored mediation in Maryland's family divisions).
87. See, e.g,. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 1-202 (Lexis Nexis 2009); S.c. CODE ANN. § 20-7110 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4C-15.4 (West 2009) (example of statutes providing representation of
parents and children in child abuse and neglect cases).
88. Mary Kay Kisthardt, Working in the Best Interest o/Children: Facilitating the Collaboration
0/ Lawyers and Social Workers in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 30 RUTGERS L. REc. 1 (2006).
89. Murphy, supra note 46, at 711.
90. Id.

91. Sinden, supra note 47, at 391.
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conditions. But informality generally offers no equivalent protections. 92

Much of the research evaluating the concerns raised here about
mediation is conflicting. The research addressing these concerns in
family mediation tends to show different results depending on a number
of factors including the type of issues mediated (custody or financial
issues), whether process or outcomes are examined, and whether the
parties have experienced both litigation and mediation.93 One difficulty
in evaluating family mediation is measuring "success.,,94 Given
mediation's focus on "needs" rather than "rights," measuring participant
"satisfaction" has been the dominant and appropriate measure of
success. Minorities and other traditionally less powerful groups may,
however, have lower expectations about how well their needs can be
met, thus rendering "satisfaction" an inadequate measure for these
individuals. "Fairness" in both process and outcome instead of
"satisfaction" should also factor into the "success" of these new forms of
alternative dispute resolution in child welfare cases.
D. The Impact of the New Paradigm on Low-Income Families

1. The Loss of Legal Rights and Privacy
The previous subparts have discussed a range of concerns about the
move from the adversary system to "therapeutic" intervention in family
law. Many of the elements of the new paradigm--compulsory
mediation of disputes, reliance on nonlegal staff, and relaxation of
procedural protections-pose greater risks for poor people. First, there
is a risk that the new approach will deprive poor litigants of their legal
rights. This risk results from many circumstances. First, these
procedures and investigations are largely informal and lack the
safeguards built into the adversary system. 95 The threat of loss of rights
is heightened for poor litigants who most often appear without lawyers
and therefore lack the protection afforded by lawyers in this unchartered
territory.96 Further, there is evidence that when these services are
92. Id.
93. Id. For a summary of some of the research regarding gender and mediation, see DIVORCE
AND FAMILY MEDIA nON: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICAnONS, supra note 68, at 456-57.
94. Waldman, supra note 72, at 765 (finding that the difficulty in measuring "success" is in part
because different mediation models place "a different weight and emphasis on the values of fairness,
disputant autonomy, social justice, and self-determination").
95. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
96. See generally Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, Legal Services for the Poor: Access. SelfInterest. and Pro Bono, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE: SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW, AND DEVIANCE (Rebecca
L. Sandefur ed., 2009) (finding that more than half of family law litigants are unrepresented); Steven K.
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offered in courts without cost to the indigent, the quality of the mediator
or evaluator is inferior to the services available for fees in a private
97
setting.
The most troubling impact on the poor of the new approach to family
dispute resolution is the increased loss of family privacy that results
from the family court's expanded role.

When family disputes are

viewed as opportunities for therapeutic and holistic interventions,98
increased state interference in family life is inevitable.

While this is a

potential risk for all parties before the court, poor families are most
vulnerable.
Low-income families, particularly mothers, have always been at risk
99
of unjustified or inappropriate state intrusion in the child welfare.
Decisions in this context have been made in infonnal proceedings under
IOo
vague standards
with resulting limited judicial review.
These
circumstances,
continuing

combined

review

and

with

state

oversight

by

and
the

federal
court

statutes
and

child

requiring
welfare

Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response to the Burdens Created
by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L. J. 105, 107-17 (2001) (at least one
spouse appearing pro se in 67% of domestic relations cases and 40% of child custody cases); Connie J.
A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce Mediation Research and Policy. 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 989, 993 (2000) (72% of domestic relations cases involved at least one
unrepresented party).
97. Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89 (2005). There is
growing concern about the risk that mediation will become justice "on the cheap" for the poor. While
the "second class" justice concerns usually focus on court-ordered mediation versus litigation, there is
growing concern that vast differences in quality may develop between private, voluntary mediation and
public, court ordered mediation. To the extent parties have resources, they will tend to choose their own
mediators and opt out of court-based programs. The remaining cases sent to mediation from the ever
expanding family law docket will be predominately poor, unrepresented litigants who have no choices
and will experience the mediation equivalent of the "mass justice" oflow-income courts. See also Carol
J. King, Burdening Access To Justice: The Cost of Divorce Mediation On The Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 375 (1999); Craig A. McEwen & Laura Williams, Legal Policy and Access to Justice Through
Courts and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 865 (1998). The problem with the education and
training of these nonlegal court personnel is discussed infra at note 158.
98. See Ross, supra note 35, at 13.
99. Murphy, supra note 46, at 707--09 (analyzing the treatment of mothers in a range of legal
proceedings involving children and noting "[B]ecause mothers overwhelmingly are the custodians and
caretakers of children, they are, in most cases, the focus of the state's intervention in cases of allegations
of child abuse or neglect. As noted, from their inception, child welfare programs focused on poor
children.").
100. Although there is variation among standards for state intervention, the language of state
statutes generally allows intervention based on abandonment; physical, sexual, or emotional "abuse"; or
failure to protect a child from abuse or educational or medical neglect. See. e.g.. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 270-271 (West 2009); D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (2009) (defining a neglected child as one "who
is without proper parental care or control ... necessary for his or her physical, mental, or emotional
health"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39 (2009); N.M. STAT. 32A-4-2 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§ 4912 (2009).
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bureaucracy,IOI have led to well-documented victimization of poor
102
women under this system.
The family court movement's increased
reliance on informal procedures like family group conferencing l03
increases the risk of unchecked state intervention, and threatens due
process in these cases. One practitioner described these new procedures
for resolving allegations of child abuse and neglect:
[I]nfonnal processes replace the initial factual adjudication of whether
acts of abuse or neglect warranting state intervention actually occurred
with a free-ranging family therapy session. There is virtually no limit on
the topics that can be discussed nor on the people who may be invited to
join. Mediation programs typically give discretion to the mediator to
invite people who are not parties to the case, including foster parents,
extended family members, and members of the "community," such as a
local church pastor. Once these people are brought to the table, all
become equal participants, entitled to have their "concerns" heard and
their "needs" met. Rather than seeking to detennine the truth of the
allegations of abuse or neglect, the focus of the discussion becomes
"[f1inding solutions which meet the competing needs and interests of all
parties." Suddenly, the needs and interests of foster parents, aunts,
uncles, grandparents, and social workers are placed on an equal footing
with those of the parents and children.
But before the family is forced to participate in therapy, the process
is supposed to first make a determination as to whether state intervention
is warranted. This stage has been skipped. In essence, the mediation
session becomes the very state intrusion that the proceeding is supposed
to determine whether or not to allow in the first place. 104
The new regime is raising similar concerns for low-income families in
proceedings involving divorce and child access. The risk of due process
violations and loss of privacy in family life has increased under the new
system with more ambitious goals for intervention and the roles of both
judges and nonjudicial personnel have changed. As noted, a principle
component of the new family court is the goal of having one judge hear
all matters involving a single family.105 This may result in both more
informed and more efficient decisionmaking. 106 But it may also result in
101. Jane C. Murphy, Protecting Children by Preserving Parenthood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 969, 973-74 (2006).
102. Id. at 974-75; see also Murphy, supra note 46, at 764-65; Morgan B. Ward Doran &
Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Families in the Child Welfare System, 61 MD. L. REv. 386
(2002).
103. See, e.g., Merkel-Holguin, supra note 48.
104. Sinden, supra note 47, at 393 (footnotes omitted) (second alteration in original).
105. Ross, supra note 35, at 17.
106. Gloria Danziger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family Court: Balancing
Intervention, Prevention, and Adjudication, 37 FAM. L.Q. 381,394 (2003).
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judges having access to information about a family that would be
inadmissible in traditional adversarial proceedings. Judges might also
reach decisions in one proceeding based upon conclusions reached in
another. 107 In addition, a judge's role in the new "problem-solving"
family court has shifted from the more narrow role of resolving disputes
to the less defined, and potentially broader, role of using the court's
authority "to motivate individuals to accept needed services and to
monitor [the parties']compliance and progress."IOS The latter role
creates a greater risk of unwarranted intervention in traditionally private
spheres of family life.
In addition to the risk of loss of privacy and due process posed by
judges in the new family courts, the wide range of nonjudicial courtsponsored actors and services in these courts pose similar risks. Given
the goal of addressing both the perceived legal and nonlegal needs of
families, parties seeking remedies like divorce or child support may be
required to comply with orders or referrals for parenting classes, 109
substance abuse or mental health evaluations, I 10 custody evaluations, III
family mediation, 112 and other similar "services."
Many commentators and practitioners have described bias in the legal
system against the poor, particularly in their roles as parents. l13 This
may trigger greater scrutiny and intrusion of the kind embraced by this
regime-required attendance at parenting education, mental health
evaluations, continuing oversight by parenting coordinators, custody
evaluators, and other newly created players in the family justice system.
The requirement that family members participate in services may even
extend to victims of domestic violence seeking protection and other
legal remedies in a family court focused on "problem solving.,,114 To
avoid "losing sight of the victim," many of these courts include the

107. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 37, at 439.
lOS. Boldt & Singer, supra note 19, at 96 (quoting Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.1055, 1060 (2003».
109. See e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-103.2 (LexisNexis 2009); Alicia M. Hehr, A Child
Shall Lead Them: Developing and Utilizing Child Protection Mediation to Beller Serve the Interests of
the Child, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 443, 455 (2007).
110. See e.g., MD. R. 16-204.
III. /d.
112. MD. R. 9-205.

113. See also, NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES (1997) (arguing that
there is an inherent bias against poor and single parent families in the legal system).
114. Joan Zorza, Specialty and Problem Solving Courts, II DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPT. 33,4748, (critiquing the intrusion and burdens on battered women in the Family Violence Court); Lowell D.
Castleton, et aI., ADA County Family Violence Court: Shaping the Means to Beller the Result, 39 FAM.
L.Q. 27 (2005).
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battered parent in orders for counseling and other services. I 15 "Services"
in these contexts require significant disclosure of personal information
by family members with few rules or procedures to protect the scope of
the information sought or, in some instances, the limits of its
dissemination. In some cases, such orders may even undermine the
goals of family safety as in the domestic violence context where a
batterer may continue control over the victim by bringing contempt
actions or otherwise using court orders for victim services as a way to
manipulate the victim. 116
For all these reasons, court ordered
participation in these programs burdens families' privacy and
encroaches upon their autonomy.
Those with resources have opportunities to limit court involvement in
family breakup and its consequences. When a court orders mediation,
parties may be able to bypass court-sponsored programs.
Their
attorneys can object to mediation, negotiate directly with opposing
counsel, or choose a private mediator. ll7 Similarly, when parties can
pay for services such as custody evaluation, courts will often allow them
to substitute their own experts for the court's staff. 118 Further, the
parties with attorneys often have negotiated agreements and can present
them at the first court proceeding. In this way, they avoid referrals for
services and remain "under the court's radar." For families who try to
navigate the system without lawyers or resources for "outside" experts
or services, involvement in the web of interventions in the new family
court is almost impossible to avoid if they seek legal remedies, such as
custody orders and child support. The following subpart illustrates how
these potential risks play out when poor families bring their disputes to
the new family courts.

115. Zorza, supra note 114, at 47.
116. /d.

117. Statistics from one court system support the need for concern that court sponsored "services"
are being utilized disproportionately by low-income families. THE WOMEN'S LAW CTR. OF MD., INC.,
CUSTODY AND FINANCIAL DISTRIBUTION IN MARYLAND: AN EMPIRCAL STUDY OF CUSTODY AND
DIVORCE CASES FILED IN MARYLAND DURlNG FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 21-22 (2004),
http://www.wlcmd.orglpdf/CustodyFinancialDistributionlnMD.pdf; THE WOMEN'S LAW CTR. OF MD.,
INC., supra note 42, at,22-24; see also Rubinson, supra note 97, at 119 n.98 (noting that "[m]ost of these
mandatory [court-based] mediation programs are for family law cases in which the vast majority of
disputants are low income.").
118. Allegra, supra note 49, at 12 (as one custody evaluator described the process, "[w]hen
[custody evaluation is warranted] the couple might agree to a private Custody Evaluation, performed by
a psychologist, retained for this purpose. The clients' attorneys are often instrumental in helping their
clients identify a psychologist, who is experienced in performing this type of evaluation. When there is
no agreement to perform a private custody evaluation, but the psychological issue still exists as an
impediment to custody-visitation arrangements, the court steps in and orders it own Custody
Evaluation").
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2. Maryland's Experience
a. Introduction
Maryland was among a small group of states to explore new ways to
handle family law matters by establishing family divisions in its five
largest jurisdictions by court rule in 1998.119 Although Maryland did not
adopt all components of the model family court,120 the courts embarked
on an ambitious experiment to approach family law decisionmaking
from a "therapeutic, holistic, and ecological" perspective "with the aim
of improving the lives of families and children and maximizing the
potential positive outcomes of court intervention.,,121 The system was
designed by an array of impressive and thoughtful jurists, scholars, and
practitioners. 122 Great care was invested in creating performance
standards to measure the new reforms' impacts.
Indeed, some
evaluation of the family division has already taken place over the eight
years since it was first established and there is every indication the
judiciary in Maryland is committed to continuing the system's
evaluation, oversight, and improvement. As such, the Maryland Family
Divisions present a particularly good court system from which to draw
examples of both the promise and risks of the new paradigm.
As with similar efforts around the country, the planned reforms in the
Family Divisions in Maryland have been difficult to achieve. The
change that has taken place has come at a cost, particularly regarding
family privacy and autonomy for low-income families. The court
system has made some effort to evaluate the performance of courts'
components. 123 But the negative impact on poor litigants' privacy and
119.

MD. R. 16-204.
120. The Family Division is assigned fairly comprehensive jurisdiction matters including
dissolution of marriage, child custody, visitation, alimony, spousal support, child support, establishment
and termination of party-child relationship, criminal nonsupport, desertion, name changes, guardianship
of minors and disabled person, involuntary admission to state facilities, family legal-medical issues,
domestic violence, and some juvenile causes but did not adopt the "one judge, one family" principle. See
id.; MD. R. 16-202(b)(I).
121. MD. JUDICIARY, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND MEASURES FOR MARYLAND'S FAMILY
DIVISIONS 48 (2002), http://www.courts.state.md.us/family/performancestandards.pdf. The report goes
on to describe the mandate of the courts: "[TJhe Family Divisions must prove to the public and to
Maryland's policymakers both the therapeutic qualities of the Family Divisions and the wisdom of the
family justice system that invests in early intervention, prevention, and treatment as a means to secure
the future well-being of Maryland's children and families." Id. at 53.
122. Id. at 46.
123. See, e.g., JOHN M. GREACEN, REPORT ON THE PROGRAMS TO ASSIST SELF REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS
OF
THE
STATE
OF
MARYLAND
3
(2004),
http://www.courts.state.md.uslfamily/evaluations_mdsummary.pdf. ("This summary evaluation is
intended to provide an overall assessment of Maryland's efforts for the benefit of the leadership of the
state's judicial branch.").
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autonomy has not been analyzed and is difficult to capture in such
evaluations.
Most parties entering the Family Divisions are
unrepresented, making them particularly vulnerable to the risk of abuses
of power within the court system. 124 Many of these litigants have no
experience with the court system and thus have limited ability to
distinguish requests from nonjudicial actors to participate voluntarily in
programs from judicial authority to compel action. For those who
regularly experience the state social service bureaucracy in other
contexts-those who may have experienced the punitive power of child
support, welfare, and child protection bureaucracies-the impulse to
comply with requests from anyone within the courthouse is strong.
Even with counsel, few "offers" for services are declined and judicial or
The
nonjudicial exercises of authority are rarely challenged. 125
following examples from two jurisdictions in Maryland illustrate the
dangers of this system. 126
b. Case #1: The Risk of "Post Judgment Monitoring,,127

Mrs. Tate, a mother of two young children, had been in an extended
relationship with her children's father who physically abused her for two
years. She was granted sole physical and legal custody of her children
and, in a separate proceeding, obtained a civil order of protection 128
against the children's father. Shortly after she obtained the order, her
ex-husband was imprisoned for violating the protection order when he
went to her home, pushed her onto the floor, and threw some of her
124. See Berenson, supra note 96; see also MD. JUDICIARY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND
CIRCUIT COURT FAMILY DIVISIONS AND FAMILY SERVICES PROGRAM 37 (2008),
http://www.courts.state.md.us/family/pdfs/annualreports/annualreport06.pdf;
LEGAL SERVS. CORP.,
DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LowINCOME AMERICANS (2007), http://www.lsc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf.
125. The combination of informal action, lack of clear standards, and limited litigant resources
have always made judicial review of family court actions rare. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 46, at 706.
126. Both of these examples involve the relatively uncommon situation of a poor litigant who is
represented by counsel. LEGAL AID BUREAU, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2007 (2007),
http://www.mdlab.orglLAB%20docs/annual%20report..10202007 (finding Maryland Legal Aid is only
able to provide counsel for 20% of those who are financially eligible for the services). I assume many
more similar or even more egregious abuses occur daily where unrepresented parties do not know they
can object or are unwilling to do so given the vague and unclear exercises of authority vested in all
players in the new family court.
127. This case is drawn from the caseload of the University of Baltimore Clinical Program in
which the author taught from 1990-2008. See Family Law Clinic File (on file with author); see also
University of Baltimore, School of Law, Clinical Law Program, http://law.ubalt.edulclinics/index.html
(last visited October I, 2008). The clinic represents low-income families primarily from Baltimore, in
the city's family court. Although much of what is reported here is a matter of public record in the court
file, the names and identifying information have been changed to protect the privacy of the client.
128. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506 (LexisNexis 2009).
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belongings out the window. Upon his release, he filed a motion to
modify custody. An attorney was appointed for the child I29 and the case
was referred for mediation, despite the domestic violence. 13o The
mother's counsel objected to mediation and the motion to modify
custody was denied, as the legal standard of a "material change of
circumstance[]" had not been met. 131
Despite denying the motion to modify custody, the master 132 viewed
this as a "high confiict"m family who warranted extended court
intervention. He modified the custody order to permit the father more
time with the children, on the condition the father attend batterers'
counseling. 134 The hearing examiner also set a series of review
hearings, though no legal issues were pending. 135 At each subsequent
hearing, the mother's behavior was scrutinized and the father gained
more and more visitation without filing anything new and without
complying with the court's previous order that he attend domestic
violence counseling.136 The repeated hearings gave the father's attorney
and the court appointed attorney for the child l37 the opportunity to argue
the father's case over and over again to a series of judicial officers, none
of whom fully understood the context of the case. 138
In the last review hearing, the master doubled the number of
129. Id. § 1-202.
130. The Maryland court rules require the court to screen for domestic violence. MD. R. 9205(b )(2) ("If a party or a child represents to the court in good faith that there is a genuine issue of
physical or sexual abuse of the party or child, and that, as a result, mediation would be inappropriate, the
court shall not order mediation."). Despite the screening requirement, there is ample evidence many
family courts in Maryland have no screening procedures in place. See Murphy & Rubinson, supra note
85.
131. Knott v. Knott, 806 A.2d 768, 772 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) ("The basis for modification of
a final order concerning care, custody, or support of a minor child is material change of circumstances,
pursuant to FL 12-104" which establishes the appropriate standard).
132. In certain Family Law actions in Maryland, a "master" will hear domestic relations matters
and has the power to regulate all proceedings in the hearing. MD. R. 9-208.
133. For a thorough discussion of the "high conflict family," see Coates et aI., supra note 50. This
phrase has become a term of art in family courts. Used in that context, "high conflict" seems to be
synonymous with "poor," and triggers greater and more sustained intervention by the courts.
134. Family Law Clinic File, supra note 127.
135. /d.
136. Id. Compliance issues with such orders are substantial, see, for example, Mandy Burton,
Judicial Monitoring of Compliance: Introducing 'Problem Solving' Approaches to Domestic Violence in
England and Wales, 20 INT'L 1.L. & POL'y & FAM. 366, 371 (2006) (citing Edward W. Gondolf,
Mandatory Court Review and Bauerer Programme Compliance, 151. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 428
(2000). This study found a significant increase in the number of men who completed court ordered
counseling programs for batterers when mandatory court review was implemented in the Pittsburgh
Domestic Violence Court. The percentage of no-shows fell from 36% to 6% and total compliance rose
by 35 %);
137. MD RULE 9-205.1 (governing appointment of child's counsel).
138. Family Law Clinic File, supra note 127.
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overnight visitation immediately after the mother expressed her
discomfort with the father taking the child to church. 139 The master also
appeared to be sympathetic to the attorney for the child's position that
the father should not have to "keep paying for the domestic violence"
even though there was evidence of such violence within months of the
court hearing and though the father had not participated in batterer's
counseling, as ordered by the court. This series of reviews and changes
in the existing child access order all happened with no motion pending,
no notice of a potential change to the mother, and no evidentiary basis or
record from which to seek review.
c. Case # 2: The Family Court Services Coordinator with Unlimited
Authority140

The statewide legal services organization in a small suburban
Maryland jurisdiction began to get complaints shortly after the
establishment of a Family Division in that court. A new position had
been created and filled for a "family court services coordinator."
According to a high-ranking legal services lawyer who received reports
from field attorneys in that jurisdiction, this coordinator, a nonlawyer
with a background in human services, acted as though her position "gave
her license to play God" with the lives of the low-income litigants who
came before the court in which she served. 141 She heard reports that
described the coordinator as "terrorizing unrepresented litigants,
particularly young mothers, in child access cases.,,142 The coordinator
was reported as regularly threatening young mothers with loss of their
children and, in some cases, making arrangements to take their kids
from them and place them with third parties; ordering random drug tests
without court order; conducting custody "evaluations" which the parent
never saw and testifying about the contents of such evaluations in child
access cases; and engaging in ex parte contacts with at least one Family
Division judge on the merits of family cases. All of these actions were
taken without a court order or other express authority.
The court employee may have been well-intentioned in some
instances, taking actions she believed were within her general authority
139. Id.
140. This illustration is drawn from interviews with a senior staff member at the Legal Aid Bureau
of Maryland, a private, nonprofit, law firm providing free legal services to low-income persons
statewide in Maryland. Legal Aid serves Baltimore City and Maryland's twenty-three counties from
thirteen office locations. See Md. Legal Aid, http://www.mdlab.org (last visited March 20, 2009).
141. Interview with Hannah Liebermann, Senior Staff Member, Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. (Jan. 3,

2006).

142. [d.
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to engage in "differentiated case management.,,143 But for the parents
for whom contact with their children was at stake, these actions
subjected them to broad violations of their privacy with no practical
means to object. While many of the problems in this jurisdiction were
connected to a single individual's inappropriate conduct,l44 they
demonstrate the risks when courts embrace ambitious agendas to address
problems beyond dispute resolution without clearly designated
procedures, grants of authority or, in some cases, the resources to
appropriately train or hire professional staff. As the supervising attorney
described, "I think [these] stories exemplify a good idea run horribly
amuck, and the need to find that often elusive balance between
formalized legal procedures, including all of the due process protections
we used to expect, and the desire to address the spectrum of issues poor
family law litigants often have.,,145
III. REACHING THE GOAL OF A FULLY REALIZED ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN
FAMILY LAW

The traditional adversary system has failed many family law litigants,
particularly in contested cases involving children. As family court
proponents have accurately noted, prevailing legal standards make
family court proceedings primarily a backward-looking process,
designed to assign blame and, as a result, add to the acrimony between
parents. But, perhaps just as problematic, those same indeterminate
standards make it difficult for parties to predict outcomes in court, and
decrease the likelihood of reaching early and less costly agreements
about child access and related issues. Even if agreements are eventually
reached in most cases, parties spend enormous resources to lawyers,
investigators, and other experts to prove the other parent unfit.
But even more critical, in terms of numbers of families affected and
degree of harm, the traditional adversary system leaves vast numbers of
unrepresented parties to navigate a court system structured with complex
procedural and pleading rules. Often failure to understand these rules
prevent access to the courts and a hearing on the merits. Even when
such access is obtained, parties' inability to understand and use technical
discovery and evidentiary rules makes it impossible to create a record
upon which relief could be granted. If unrepresented parties are able to
gather facts and present them in a way admissible in court, the broad
143.
144.

MD. JUDICIARY,supra note 121, at 15.
These problems were eventually reported by the Legal Aid Bureau to Maryland's
Administrative Office of the Courts who responded quickly and appropriately.
145. Interview with Hannah Lieberman, supra note 141.
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indeterminate standards governing most family law cases make it
difficult for parties to discern what might convince a judge to grant
access to a child or other remedy.146 As a result, unrepresented parties
are threatened with loss of their children. 147
The problem-solving family court described in this Article is one
response to the limits of the adversary system to resolve family cases in
today's courts. But the new problem-solving courts do little to address
the problems that most significantly contribute to the failure of the
adversary system to protect children-indeterminate legal standards that
encourage acrimony, delay, and expense for parents and lack of
affordable sources of legal information and advice. And, by abandoning
the long-held protections afforded litigants in the adversary system, the
new courts make many families more vulnerable. The need for
flexibility and a range of mUltidisciplinary actors to make decisions in
the new courts creates a risk that some parties will unknowingly give up
legal rights. In addition, ambitious efforts to educate, treat, and monitor
families in conflict results in loss of privacy for families. The
interventions and resultant loss of privacy may be unjustified in many
cases. Even where some intervention may be helpful, the damage to
family stability from the court's interference may outweigh any
therapeutic benefits. And these risks to legal protections and family
privacy fall disproportionately on the poor who most often fall under the
state's scrutiny, including its courts.
Solutions lie in improving and sharpening the focus of the adversary
system so it can better perform its dispute resolution functions, rather
than abandoning it for a new one. This involves combining elements
from a number of family law reform movements that have been
developing independently over the last decade.
A. Improving the Legal Standard for Resolving Child Access Disputes

The legal framework for deciding family law cases has been subject
to substantial critique over the last two decades. The most promising
effort for improving the adversary system in family law cases is the
movement away from broad legal standards to rules. 148 Standards in
146. For a detailed description of the experience of a typical pro se litigant in a family law case in
the traditional adversary system, see Murphy, supra note 28, at 127-31.
147. See. e.g., Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A. 2d 114 (Md. 2003) (describing the plight of an
unrepresented mother who had onerous conditions placed on her right to continuing care and custody of
her children without a finding of unfitness); see also Stephen H. Sachs, Seeking a RighI to Appointed
Counsel in Civil Cases in Maryland, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 5 (2007) (providing additional details of the
Frase v. Barnhardt case from the perspective of the lawyer appealing her custody case).
148. See generally Murphy, supra note II, at 226-31; Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and
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family law for allocating family assets, deciding child custody and
visitation, child support, and alimony historically were characterized by
broad discretion. But the movement from discretion to rules for grounds
of divorce started a trend away from such broad standards. 149 The shift
from broad standards to rules is also firmly established for child
support l50 and is underway for alimony and property distribution. 151 But
the most important shift for improving family dispute resolution for
children would be to replace the prevailing best interests standard in
child access cases with a predictable rule grounded in minimizing
conflict at divorce. The first round of efforts in this direction focused on
the primary caretaker rule. This proposed rule directed judges to
presume children's interests are best served by continuing to live with
their primary caretaker after parental breakup.152 Advocates of the
primary caretaker rule argued that it best advanced certainty and
predictability while furthering the goal of producing decisions in the

Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REv. IIII
(1999).
149. See Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of
Morality in Family Law, supra note 148. Some have argued that the movement away from fault-based
divorce has hurt women and children. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract,
Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 719, 723
(1997). But most agree that this change has "achieved the goals of reducing acrimony and trauma to
families, particularly children, experiencing divorce. Murphy, supra, at 1202.
ISO. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH ApPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 763 (1998)
(describing child support enforcement techniques as having "undergone a revolution in recent decades
as a result of federal involvement").
151. A number of proposals emphasize income sharing to equalize the post-divorce standards of
living of divorcing couples. For some early articulations of these proposals see Jane Rutherford, Duty in
Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 563-64, 573, 578-83, 592
(1990); Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic
Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. LJ. 2423 (1994); Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests
on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130, 159-60 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma
Hill Kay eds., 1990) (proposing a system in which each spouse's interest in post-divorce income would
be based on the length of marriage); Kaufman Ctr. for Family Law, Kaufman Alimony Guidelines,
http://www.kaufmanalimonyguidelines.org! (last visited May 20, 2010) (interactive calculator to assist
judges and lawyers in the state of Maryland to develop alimony awards to achieve equitable results).
Some of these proposals have made their way into law. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (2009); MICH.
COMPo LAWS ANN. § 552.13 (West 2009); Gregory J.M. v. Carolyn A.M., 442 A.2d 1373, 1377 (Del.
1982); Ball v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1196-97 (Pa. 1994). The ALI Principles also contain formulae
designed to be predictably and consistently applied to return spouses to their premarital financial
position after short marriages and compensate financially vulnerable spouses in longer marriages for
their marital investment. AM. LAW INST, supra note 5, §§ 5.04, 5.13.
152. As discussed earlier, Martha Fineman offered one of the earliest primary caretaker proposals
as a way of reintroducing law as the "dominant discourse" in custody decisionmaking. See supra notes
54-59 and accompanying text. Over the last two decades, both courts and commentators have offered
variations of this rule. See Cochran, supra note 59, at 37; Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent
Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 168, 180-82 (1984) (arguing
for a presumptive rule in favor of the primary caretaker).
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child's best interests. But very few primary caretaker proposals have
found their way into law. 153
More recently, the "approximation standard" has been proposed as an
alternative rule that continues to emphasize minimizing trauma by
presuming parents will continue prebreakup caretaking roles but
promotes an expanded role for the noncustodial parent. 154 This
approach, which has been embraced in the ALI Principles,155 responds to
many of the concerns about child custody proceedings in the adversary
system under the best interests standard. Its relatively straightforward
factual inquiry about parenting behavior should minimize the trauma of
family breakup. It should also make court decisions more predictable,
thus encouraging informed agreements in mediation and less costly trials
when agreement is not reached. 156 For this reason, advocates for
healthier and more therapeutic family dispute processes should advocate
for its adoption.
B. Make Nonlegal Services Readily Available But Not Mandatory

In addition to substantive law changes, incorporating some elements
of the problem solving approach into the adversary structure would
improve the family dispute resolution system. Using dispute resolution
to offer families needed services-educational, mental health, and
financial-is a good idea. But it may be both impractical and
153. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981). Garska has been modified by
recent statutory changes in West Virginia that continue to instruct judges to allocate custodial
responsibility for children based upon past caretaking responsibilities, but do not create a presumption in
favor of the primary caretaker. W. VA. CODE § 48-9-206 (2009) (stating the court shall take into
account the past caretaking responsibilities when deciding custody sharing); see also The Ramifications
of West Virginia's Codified Child Custody Law: A Departure from Garska v. McCoy, 106 W. VA. L.
REv. 389 (2004). After its adoption in Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Minn. 1985), the
Minnesota Legislature rejected the primary caretaker presumption and restored the best interest
standard. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009); see also Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of
the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year
Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427, 428-29 (1990) (concluding
Minnesota courts continue to place strong emphasis on the primary caretaker as a factor in the best
interest equation).
154. Elizabeth Scott first proposed the "approximation" rule in which the decision maker "focuses
(almost) exclusively on the past relationship between parents and child and seeks to approximate as
closely as possible the predivorce patterns of parental responsibility in the custody arrangement."
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REv. 615, 630
(1992).
155. AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, § 2.02; see also Robert J. Levy, Custody Laws and the ALI's
Principles: A Little History, a Little Policy, and Some Very Tentative Judgments, in RECONCEIVING THE
FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION, supra note 5, at 67, 74.
156. Scott, supra note 154, at 643.
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duplicative to create in-house programs staffed by court personnel for
most services. Instead, family courts should coordinate with appropriate
state, local, and private agencies to make meaningful referrals to parties
who need this assistance. In this way, courts can preserve resources for
their essential dispute resolution function.
Further, participation in most services should be voluntary, rather
than a condition of receiving a legal remedy to which a party is
otherwise entitled. 157 Services such as postjudgment monitoring by a
parent coordinator and, in the absence of unfitness, parenting education
are more effective and less intrusive if desired by the parties receiving
such support. At a minimum, a judicial officer should have to make
clearly defined findings before compulsory services are ordered. Those
administering such services should be properly trained, credentialed, and
have legally defined authority .158
C. Improve the Quality of Family Mediation

Another element of the problem solving courts that needs to be
preserved, but refined, is mediation. While mediation programs
predated many family courts, the family court movement has made them
a centerpiece of conflict resolution. 159 Mediation, combined with
parenting plans,160 can offer families a private, perhaps less costly, 161

157. The imposition of services as a prerequisite to divorce may be subject to constitutional
challenge. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 410 U.S. 371 (1971) (finding that because the state's regulation
of marriage and divorce, in the generic sense, is an assumption of governmental power, the state cannot
deny access to its courts for divorce by requiring a court fee from those who cannot pay).
158. The Maryland Rules Committee is currently working on rules to standardize the work of
parenting coordinators) and custody evaluators. See Parenting Coordination in Cases Involving Child
Custody (Draft Rules 2009).
159. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
160. Robert A Baruch Bush & Sally Ganong Pope, Transformative Mediation: Changing the
Quality of Family Conflict Interaction, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES,
AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 68, at 53, 55, 57, 59--63, 67--69 (another recent article describing
parenting plans especially in connection with mediation); see also Linda D. Elrod & Mildred D. Dale,

Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42
FAM. L.Q. 381 (2008).
161. Many claim that mediation improves access to dispute resolution for the participants by
giving parties the opportunity to resolve disputes with fewer costs.
The process is simple,
communication is direct, and the formalities of court are discarded. Parties have more control over the
process and can arrive at resolution of their disputes more quickly and without substantial time spent in
court proceedings away from work and other responsibilities. See. e.g.. FORREST S. MOSTEN, THE
COMPLETE GUIDE TO MEDIATION: THE CUTTING EDGE ApPROACH TO FAMILY LAW PRACTICE 60
(1997); Wayne D. Brazil, Why Should Courts Offer Nonbinding ADR Services?, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO
THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 65 (1998) (arguing that the poor should have access to court-sponsored
alternative dispute resolution and not be "relegated" to the delays and expense of the adversarial
system).
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setting to plan for parenting of children after breakup. Mediation helps
parties avoid the public acrimony of a trial and focus on common
ground, thus preserving family relationships. Mediation might even
offer a better alternative than the adversary system for accommodating
diverse family traditions. Mediation's informality gives it the potential
to address cultural differences in ways litigation may not. 162
Despite these advantages, the virtually unchecked risk that parties
without lawyers will enter agreements without adequate information and
advice makes the current widespread and often compulsory mediation of
child access disputes troubling. Many of the current programs have no
mechanism to ensure that unrepresented parties can obtain legal
information or advice before, during, or after mediation. It is, therefore,
risky to require low income and unrepresented litigants to use this
process as an alternative to litigation to make informed agreements.
Other concerns about the unbridled enthusiasm for mediation of child
access disputes include bias toward joint custody among some
mediators l63 and the inadequacy of most court-sponsored programs to
screen cases for domestic violence. l64 Responding to these risks and
concerns does not require abandoning mediation in favor of trials in all
cases. Instead, mediation can exist as an option in the adversary system
if we develop a structure that provides resources to ensure individuals
receive legal advice when needed during the mediation process. A range
of solutions exist to address these issues from reconceiving the role of
the mediator as including educating the parties about their legal rightsl65
to providing limited legal representation during mediation. 166
D. Guarantee Access to Legal Information, Advice, or Representation
The problem of lack of access to legal information is not limited to
mediation, but pervades the family justice system. Judges, advocates,
and scholars agree that the primary reason the traditional family justice
162. Harold Abramson, Crossing Borders Into New Ethical Territory: Ethical Challenges When
Mediating Cross· Culturally, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 921,922-37,942 (2008).
163. See, e.g., Carol Bohmer & Marilyn Ray, Effects of Different Dispute Resolution Methods on
Women and Children After Divorce, 28 FAM. L. Q. 223, 234 (1994).
164. See Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 85.
165. Engler, supra note 80, at 1989; see also Russell Engler, Toward a Context-Based Civil Right
to Counsel Through "Access to Justice" Initiatives, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Jul.-Aug. 2006, at 196;
Waldman,_supra note 72, at 741.
166. See, e.g., Jon Moseley, Mediation Program Acquires New Partner. MD. BAR BULL., Jan.
2010,
available
at
http://www.msba.orgldepartments/commpubllpublicationslbar_bultl20 10/
january/probono.asp (describing the University of Baltimore's Family Mediation Clinic's Pro Bono
Representation Project in which parties in child access mediation are afforded free limited representation
during court ordered mediation sessions).
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system is dysfunctional is that the assumption upon which the system
167
The

was built-a client and lawyer on each side-is no longer true.

most critical reform, therefore, necessary to fully realize the benefits of
the adversary system in cases involving children is access to legal
information, advice, and in some cases, full representation.
necessary supports are already in place.

Some

These include developing

standardized family law pleadings,168 establishing court-based pro se
projects to provide limited legal advice to unrepresented parties in
family law cases,169 telephone hodines,170 educational websites,171 and
innovations in the delivery of direct legal services, such as limited
representation at critical stages in the dispute.172
But even in those jurisdictions where most or all of these programs
are available, legal scholars, judges, and advocates have long recognized
173
The

that such support is inadequate in contested child access cases.
right to counsel

in civil

cases affecting fundamental rights-the so called

Civil Gideon-has been advanced in the context of a wide variety of
issues including the right to housing,174 health and other government

167. See, e.g., Judges' Views of Pro Se Litigants' Effect on Courts, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. ,
July·Aug. 2006, 228 (detailing the ways in which pro se litigants burden the court); Jona Goldschmidt,
The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar
Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36 (2002); Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God":
Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2475 (1999); MD. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM'N,
INTERIM REPORT AND RECCOMENDATIONS (2009), http://www.courts.state.md.us/mdatjc/pdfs/
interimreportl I 1009.pdf.
168. See BONNIE ROSE HOUGH, DESCRIPTION OF CALIFORNIA COURTS' PROGRAMS FOR SELF·
REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS
(2003),
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/
documentslharvard.pdf.
169. Michael Millemann et aI., Rethinking the Full-Service Legal Representational Model: A
Maryland Experiment, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 1178, 1181 n.IO (describing the
joint efforts of the University of Baltimore Family Law Clinic and the University of Maryland in
establishing the first court-based Pro Se Projects in Baltimore City, Baltimore, Anne Arundel, and
Montgomery counties.) For a description of the pro se assistance projects in each of the circuits in
Maryland,
see
Maryland
Judiciary,
Family
Law
Self-Help
Centers,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/family/selfhelp.html(last visited May 20, 2010); see also Margaret
Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono
Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1897 (1999);
Nathalie Gilfrich et aI., Law Students Assist Pro Se Litigants in Maryland, 81 JUDICATURE 82 (1997).
170. See, e.g., The Women's Law Ctr. Of Md., Inc., Projects, http://www.wlcmd.orglprojects.html
(last visited March 15,2009) (maintaining several hotlines, including a Family Law Hotline and a Legal
Fonns Helpine).
171. See, e.g., Maryland Legal Assistance Network, Family Law Center, http://www.peopleslaw.info/Home/PublicWeblIndexPageslI390000 (last visited May 20, 2010).
172. See FORREST S. MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE To DELIVERING LEGAL
SERVICES A LA CARTE (2000).
173. Gi Ifrich et aI., supra note 169; (describing the "most important advice" given by law students
staffing pro se offices was to "retain counsel" in cases involving child custody but noting the lack of free
representation).
174. See, e.g., Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their homes in Legal Proceedings
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benefits,175 and employment and income maintenance.176 But advocacy
for a right to counsel in civil cases has gathered particular momentum in
the child access area. l77 Most argue for a right to counsel based on the
constitutionally protected right to family privacyl78 or on procedural due
process grounds in child access cases brought by the government. 179
Most of these arguments are grounded in federal constitutional claims,
but some scholars 180 and courts 181 have framed arguments in terms of
state constitutional law. Others have advocated for this right on the
general principle that equal justice under law cannot exist where some
parents are denied meaningful access to the courts because they cannot
afford counsel. I82 Whatever the theory for insuring this right, the
presence of counsel would have a profound effect in providing
meaningful hearings in child access proceedings within the traditional
adversary system, particularly if the standards governing child access
cases were modified as this Article has proposed. 183
Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUBLIC L. POL'y & ETHICS J. 699 (2006); Rachel Klienman,
Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1507 (2004); Andrew
Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in
Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 557 (1988); Frances Werner, Toward a Right to
Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings, 17 HOUSING L. BULL. 65 (1987).
175. See Lisa Brodoff et aI., The ADA: One Avenue to Appointed Counsel Before a Full Civil
Gideon, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 609 (2004).
176. See Andrew Scherer, Securing a Civil Right to Counsel: The [mportance of Collaborating,

30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 675, 676 (2006).
177. John Nethercut, "This Issue Will Not Go Away": Continuing to Seek the Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases, 38 CLEARING HOUSE REv., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 481.
178. Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases,
40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv., July-Aug 2006, at 245.
179. Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights
Proceedings: The States' Response to Lassiter, 14 TOURO L. REv. 247 (1997).
180. See, e.g., Mary Helen McNeal, Toward a "Civil Gideon" Under the Montana Constitution:
Parental Rights as the Starting Point, 66 MONT. L. REV. 81 (2005); James A. Bamberger, Confirming
the Constitutional Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts in Non-Criminal Cases in Washington
State, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 383 (2005); Deborah Perluss, Washington's Constitutional Right to
Counsel in Civil Cases: Access to Justice v. Fundamental [nterest, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 571 (2004);
Earl Johnson Jr. & Elizabeth Schwartz, Beyond Payne: The Case for a Legally Enforceable Right to
Representation in Civil Casesfor Indigent California Litigants, 11 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 249 (1978).
181. Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-Counsel Decisions,
40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv., July-Aug. 2006, at 186; Karen J. Coombs, What Gives You the Right?:
Recent Decisions on the Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 44 N.H. BAR J., Sept. 2004, at II.
182. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, [n the [nterests ofJustice: Human Rights and the Right to Counsel
in Civil Cases, 25 TOURO L. REv 147, (2009); Dennis A. Kaufman, The Tipping Point on the Scales of
Civil Justice, 25 TOURO L. REv 347 (2009).

183. The "Civil Gideon" movement won a substantial victory in October, 2009 when the
California became "the first state in the nation to establish a model program providing a right to counsel
for low income people in critical civil cases" including child custody, housing, domestic violence and
elder abuse. California Becomes Nation's First State to Assure Lawyers in Civil Cases, CAL. CHRON.,
Oct. 13,2009, available at http://www.californiachronicle.com/articles/view/123693. The language of
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V. CONCLUSION

Before we reject the adversary system for child access cases, we
should evaluate its efficacy with the improvements this Article
advocates. Reforming the substantive legal standard governing child
access cases will assist parties in focusing on parenting in these
proceedings instead of trying to meet the broad definition of unfitness
inherent in the best interests standard. Further, the rule-based nature of
the approximation or primary caretaker standard will assist parties in
predicting outcomes if cases go to litigation, thus making it easier to
evaluate agreements proposed in mediation. Making nonlegal services
voluntary would limit the interference on family privacy. Finally,
offering legal information and advice and, in some circumstances, full
legal representation, would permit more informed use of alternative
dispute resolution and a properly functioning adversary system. Justice
can, indeed, be tempered with mercy if we work to improve, rather than
abandon, the family justice system.

the legislation itself recognizes how critical legal representation is to fully realizing the benefits of the
adversary system:
The adversarial system of justice relied upon in the United States inevitably allocates to
the parties the primary responsibility for discovering the relevant evidence, finding the
relevant legal principles, and presenting them to a neutral judge or jury. Discharging
these responsibilities generally requires the knowledge and skills of a legally trained
professional. The absence of representation not only disadvantages parties, it has a
negative effect on the functioning of the judicial system. When parties lack legal
counsel, courts must cope with the need to provide guidance and assistance to ensure that
the matter is properly administered and the parties receive a fair trial or hearing.
A.B. 590, 2009-20 10 Sess. § I (i) (Cal. 2009), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09I 0IbiIVasm/ab_0551-0600/ab_590_bill_20091 0 ll_chaptered.pdf.

